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ABSTRACT 
This paper constructs the optimal incentive structure for an 
economy through the simultaneous choice of the optimal income tax and 
the optimal information structure. An information structure in the 
economy is given by the proportion of workers whose productivity is 
directly observable by employers relative to the n11111ber who can only 
convey productivity through a signal. A second-best situation exists 
because the government has distributional goals and the tax it levies 
to achieve these goals depends on income and not on ability. 
The main result of this paper is that the optimal information 
structure is the one where the productivity of no worker is directly 
observable by employers, i. e., all workera must signal productivity. 
This result comes about because the income tax may be adjusted when 
productivity is not observable to achieve any distribution of incomes 
that is possible when produotivity is observable. In addition, the 
incentive effects of signaling serve to offset the disincentive 
effects of the income tax. 
INCENTIVES AND THE OPTIMALLY IMPERFECT INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
Ross M. Miller 
I. IN'IRODUCTION 
This paper constructs the optimal incentive structure for an 
economy by considering not only the optimal payoff (tax) schedule for 
the economy but also by determining the optimal information structure 
for the economy. The vast literature in optimal taxation theory that 
has been done along the lines of Mirrlees' (1971) seminal work has 
generally assumed that the information structure of the economy is 
given and only the tax schedule is subject to adjustment by the taxing 
authority. 
This paper derives the optimal income tax and information 
structure for an economy where employees choose a productivity­
enhancing activity (referred to as education) where that activity may 
also serve as a signal of productivity.1 The productivity of at least 
some of the employees (including the productivity due to education) is 
capable of being observed directly and noiselessly by employers, but 
employers can only infer the productivity of the other employees from 
their education. An information structure for the economy may then be 
defined in terms of the number of workers whose productivity is 
directly observable by employers relative to the number who can only 
signal productivity. 
The main result of this paper is that in an economy with two 
productivity types, it is optimal to allow no employer to use 
information about productiv�ty, i.e., it is optimal to make all 
workers go through the signaling process. 
It has long been known that restrictions on the transmission 
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of information may be socially beneficial. Hirshleifer (1971), Arrow 
(1973) and Spence (1974b) show that that this will be the case when 
the information generating aotivity is not productive in the usual 
sense and serves only to redistribute income in a way that increases 
the spread of incomes. In the context of the principal and agent 
relationship Green (1979) and Green and Stokey (1980) show that a more 
informative information structure may leave both principal and agent 
worse off. In general, however, more information can benefit both 
principal and agent, even if the information is extremely noisy, as in 
Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979). 
The important feature which differentiates this paper from 
previous work is that the information structure is chosen in a setting 
where an income tax may be optimally chosen. The fact that the choice 
of information structure has positive distributional effects stands in 
striking contrast to the work of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and 
Shavell (1981), where distributional objectives are satisfied through 
the choice of the income tax and cannot be achieved otherwise. Hylland 
and Zeckhauser show that government programs providing benefits that 
depend on an individual's pre-tax (or post-tax) income should be 
designed to maximize net benefits (i.e., they should not be used to 
redistribute income). Their result does not extend to the case where 
benefits depend on ability; hence, it does not apply to the choice of 
information structure as presented in this paper. A more informative 
information structure in this paper will benefit high ability 
(productivity) workers at the expense of low ability (productivity) 
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workers independent of their incomes. 
This paper starts with the basic problem of optimal income 
taxation theory: the achievement of distributional goals in an 
economy causes a change in individual incentives that results in 
inefficiency. This inefficiency is a result of the standard assumption 
in the theory of optimal income taxation that ability cannot be taxed. 
In this model the inefficiency manifests itself as an underinvestment 
in education. Inducing the use of education as a signal by making 
productivity unobservable increases the incentives to purchase 
education and counteracts the disincentive effect of the income tax. 
Alternatively, as the proof of the main result demonstrates, a 
(nonlinear) income tax can be structured not only to remedy the 
inefficiency of signaling behavior, as Spence (1974a) sh01rs, but also 
can be adjusted to achieve any distribution goal that is achievable 
when productivity is observable. Since denying the use of information 
about productivity may viewed as the revocation of a property right of 
the more productive workers, income is more easily redistributed when 
these workers are forced to signal productivity. The government may 
also induce signaling behavior without affecting the observability of 
productivity by requiring that employers make wage decisions that are 
based solely upon the signal, as is the case with affirmative action 
rules. 
This paper begins by comparing the case the productivity of 
all workers is observable with the case where all workers must signal. 
The extension to intermediate information structures is facilitated by 
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examining the extreme cases first. Section II develops the 
productivity observable case and Section III develops the education 
observable (signaling) case. In Section IV it is proved that the 
signaling information structure always yields as much welfare as the 
observable productivity information structure. Section V gives a 
numerical example which illustrates the result in Section IV. Section 
VI states and proves the general theorem that the signaling 
information structure yields at least as much welfare as the 
intermediate information structures where some workers' productivity 
is observable. Section VII discusses the general interpretation of 
this model as it applies to other incentive problems. Extensions of 
the model are also discussed. 
II. PRODUCTIVITY OBSERVABLE BY EMPLOYERS
This section derives the optimal income tax for an economy 
with two types of individuals: low productivity and high productivity. 
.Employers observe productivity directly and the taxing authority 
observes income. Productivity is positively related to ability (which 
is higher for the high productivity group) and nonnegatively related 
to education. The inability of the taxing authority to observe 
ability directly and levy a lump-sum tax which depends on ability 
results in a second-best situation when redistributional aims are 
significantly large. Of course, if only efficiency is desired, it may 
be achieved by levying no tax at all.2 
We n01r introduce some notation and assumptions that will be 
s 
used throughout the paper. The low productivity group is represented 
by the subscript 1 and the high productivity group is represented by 
the subscript 2 .  I n  Section VI, when there will b e  two kinds o f  high 
productivity individuals, a third subscript will have to be 
introduced. For notational simplicity it is assumed that there are an 
equal number of high and low productivity workers and all variables 
are normalized to their per worker values. This is done without loss 
of generality. Individuals can produce output only when employed by 
firms, jobs are indivisible (i.e • •  there is no labor/ leisure choice) 
Further, the productivity of an individual is independent of any 
action by his employer. This assumption means that returns to scale 
are constant in labor input and that job assignment does not affect 
productivity. 
The following notation will be used: 
Y i= education of ith type of individual 
si(y) =productivity of the ith type as a function of 
education 
Ci (y) cost of education of the ith type as a function of 
education 
ci(s) = cost of education required by ith type to attain a 
productivity of s 
Yi = after-tax wage income 
Ni = Yi - ci = after-tax income net of education costs 
G(�. �) = social welfare 
All the functions given about are defined on the nonnegative reals and 
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all variables take on nonnegative values. The wage function (and its 
complement, the tax/subsidy function), however, are only defined at 
those levels of productivity (which is the pre-tax wage) that are 
observed. Alternatively, the tax/subsidy function may be thought of 
as being defined on all nonnegative pre-tax wages, but is nonlinear 
enough to induce only two (in Section III, three) pre-tax wage levels 
to be chosen. 
Productivity functions are assumed throughout to have the 
following properties: 
(1) 
(2) and 
•2 (y) > sl (y) > 0
I I 
s2 (y) l s1 (y) l O. 
Bence, high productivity individuals have higher total and at least as 
high marginal productivity for a given level of education than low 
productivity individuals. Properties of the cost function are: 
(3) 
(4) and 
c1(y) l c2Cy) l O. 
, , 
c1(y) > c1(y) > O. 
Therefore, higher productivity workers have lower marginal and at 
least as low total education costs. Assumption (4) implies that (3) 
can hold with equalities only for y=O. These assumptions ensure that 
when productivity cannot be directly observed, more education will 
signal higher productivity. Productivity and cost functions are 
related by the second derivative condition, 
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(5) s� , (y) ,
, 
c i (y) < 0. 
Further, it is assumed that at some level of education. its marginal 
productivity is less than its marginal cost for each type of worker. 
This assumption ensures that the optimal education choices are 
bounded. 
The assumptions made about productivity and cost functions are 
not at all restrictive and include as a special case education having 
no direct contribution to productivity. 
We now consider the optimal taxation problem faced by a 
government that wishes to maximize a concave social welfare function 
in an economy where firms can observe productivity and are forced by 
competition to pay each worker a wage (salary) equal to his 
productivity. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that workers can 
be viewed as choosing their productivity directly. which indirectly 
determines their education. Cost as a function of productivity is 
defined in terms of the education cost function by the 'identity 
( 6) Ci(s) :: ci(yi(s)) 
where Y i(s) = min y such that si(y) 2. s. From (1) and this definition 
of the cost of productivity. (3) and (4) imply, respectively, 
(7a) 
and 
(7b) 
c
�(s) 2. c;(s) 2. o. 
cl(s) 2. cz(s) 2. 0, 
only if y1 ( s)=O.
only if y1(s)=O. 
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The design of the optimal income tax may be thought of as the 
choice of the productivity for each type Cs1 and s2) and associated 
after-tax wages Cw1 and w2) that maximize social welfare. A worker 
with a pre-tax income of s1 pays an income tax of s1-w1 (this turns 
out always to be negative. hence, it is a subsidy) and an worker with 
a pre-tax income of s2 pays an income tax of s2-w2• The tax cannot be 
made to depend on ability; however. after a worker chooses his 
productivity level (via education) the government can infer which type 
of worker he is. 
The choice of wages and productivities must be consistent with 
individual maximization of net income, which is written 
Ni(w, s) = w - ci(s), 
Note that w and s are not continuously variable, they may take on only 
two sets of values. which are given by the tax schedule. The 
assumption that individuals maximize net income is equivalent to the 
assumption that the cost (or disutility) of education is independent 
of the worker' s after-tax wage. This independence, though not a 
necessary assumption, facilitates the correction of signaling 
externalities by the income tax (see Section III), 
The optimal taxation problem made then be written as the 
choice of s1, s2, w1, and w2 to
(Sa) Max G(wl - c1<•1>· W2 - cz<s2>> 
(Sb) 
(Sc) 
(Sd) 
subject to sl + s2 - wl - w2 2. o. 
92 - c2<s2> - 91 + c2(sl) 2. O, 
and w1 - c1(s1) - w2 + c1Cs2) 2. 0, 
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where G i>O and G is (weakly) quasi-concave and favors equity in the
following sense, for a given value of ?\ + Nz welfare increases as the
difference between N1 and N2 decreases in absolute value. (A special
case of this kind of social welfare function is G(N1. Nz> = v(Ni_)+vCNz> 
for v concave, which is a form of the standard utilitarian social 
welfare function used in optimal taxation theory.) In general, this 
function may be viewed as representing the distributional weights of 
the government. Hence, the approach taken in this paper is strictly 
utilitarian; the relative desirability of tax and information policies 
depends only on the net income these policies yield individuals. 
In the optimization problem above, (Sb) is the balanced budget 
constraint (recall that there are equal numbers of each type). 
Constraints (Sc) and (Sd) are the conditions for individual 
optimization by 2 's and l's, respectively. lhis optimization is 
simplified considerably by the following observation: 
Proposition!: Constraint (Sc) holds with equality and 
constraint (Sd) .i§. redundant. 
Proof. 
(9) 
Rewrite constraints (Sc) and (Sd) as 
JS2 I JS2 I sl c1(s)ds 2. w2 - w1 2. sl c2(s)ds. 
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Inequalities (7a) and (9) imply that s22_s1 and w22.w1• Further, Nz2.N1• 
lhis follows from rearranging (Sc) and using (7b), giving 
w2 - c2<s2> 2. wl - c2(sl) 2. wl - cl(sl).
Suppose that s1 and s2 are set optimally. lhen this choice of 
productivity levels determines the total net output, ?\+Nz. Since we
know that N2 must always be at least as great as N1• it follows that 
the smaller the difference between w2 and w1 is made, the smaller the 
absolute difference between N2 and N1 is made. Hence, because the 
social welfare function favors equity, (Sc) should hold with equality 
(making w2-w1 as small as possible). If (Sc) holds with equality. it 
follows from (9) that (Sd) must be satisfied. 
Proposition 1 shows that the subsidy given to the low 
productivity workers ''tempts'' high productivity workers more than 
the higher productivity (and higher education costs) of high 
productivity coupled with the tax on their income tempts low 
productivity workers. 
lhe Lagrangean for the constrained optimization (Sa)-(Sc) is 
then 
(10) L = G(w1 - c1cs1) ,  w2 - c2Cs2>> 
+ l(s1 + s2 - w1 - w2> 
+ µ(w2 - c2<s2> - •1 + c2<s1>>. 
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Noting that the first constraint must hold with equality and assuming 
that corner solutions are excluded,3 the first-order conditions are 
(lla) 
(llb) 
(llc) 
(lld) 
(lle) 
(llf) 
• • = 0 61 - A - p 
• • 
62 - A + p = 0 
I • • • I • 
-61c1Cs1) +A + p c2Cs1) = 0 
' . . . ' . -62c2Cs2) + A - p c2Cs2 ) = 0 
• • • • sl + s2 - wl - w2 = O 
• • • • w2 - c2(s2) - wl + c2<51> = O, 
where *'s denote optimal values of the variables. That the Lagrange 
multipliers take on positive values follows from the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for the optimization associated with the inequality 
constraints (8b) and (80), 
Examination of these first-order conditions gives the 
fallowing result: 
Proposition 1_: High productiyity yorkers choose the efficient 
1.2.W ..!!.! education .!A!! .12.x produotiyity yorkers � less .!hy the 
efficient lll2.l· 
Proof. 
(llb) and (lld) => 
(lla) and (llc) => 
• • c2Cs2> = 1 (efficiency). 
. , . . . ' . , . A c1Cs1) =A + p Cc2Cs1) - c1Cs1)), 
• • I • A > o. p > 0, and (7a) => c1Cs1) < 1 
Proposition 2 illustrates the ''screening'' aspect of the 
optimal income tax (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). In order to 
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identify themselves as workers who are eligible for a subsidy payment. 
low productivity workers must be screened out from the high 
productivity workers via the tax schedule. Because low productivity 
workers have a higher cost of acquiring productive capacity, they 
possess a ''comparative advantage'' in not educating themselves 
relative to high productivity workers. Bence, underinvestment in 
education serves as the screening mechanism for keeping high 
productivity workers from receiving the subsidy. 
An inefficient choice of the education level for high 
productivity workers is wasteful not only in reducing the total net 
income of the economy, it also makes the subsidy received by low 
productivity workers more attractive to high productivity workers 
because high productivity workers will have a lower prEr-tax income net 
of education costs than they would than when they receive the 
efficient level of education. That low productivity workers will 
prefer that high productivity workers get the efficient level of 
education can be easily seen algebraically. We will show that for any 
level of education for low productivity workers, s1, lov productivity 
workers will get the greatest net income, given that (Sc) and (8d) 
must be satisified with equality. when s2 is set at the efficient 
level. Solving the first constraint for w2 and substituting into the 
second constraint gives 
s2 - c2Cs2 } = 2 w1 - s1 - c2Cs1}. 
So for a fixed level of s1, w1 is maximized when 52 is set at the 
efficient level, which in turn maximizes N1• 
III. EDUCATION OBSERVABLE BY EMPLOYERS 
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In this section it is assum·ed that employers cannot observe 
productivity, rather, they infer it through an individual's education. 
As before, the taxing authority observes pre-tax wages, which in a 
signaling equilibrium are equal to productivity, and determines the 
tax/subsidy from them. This model is the two-class version of the 
model of optimal incentive mechanisms studied in the case of a 
continuum of agents by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Spence (1974a} 
and Miller (1978). 
As before, employers are competitive and so profits on labor 
are driven to zero. Although employers do not observe productivity at 
the time of employment, after employees are paid firms can determine, 
in aggregate, the productivity of individuals with a given education. 
A signaling equilibrium is a wage/education schedule such that the 
aggregate productivity of individuals who choose a given education is 
equal to their (pre-tax } wage and such that no employer can offer a 
wage/education schedule that makes a nonzero profit given the other 
employers' schedules.4 Under the assumptions made about cost and 
productivity functions, an equilibrium will exist and will be 
separating, i.e. , high and low producitivity workers will choose 
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different education levels.5 In such an equilibrium the pre-tax wage 
of each work.er must be equal to his productivity; otherwise, ''cream-­
skimming'' would occur. 
The after-tax wage of a worker of type i is, as before, wi' 
and his education is yi. Workers choose the education so as to 
maximize net income, 
Ni(w, y} = w - ci(y}.
The only difference between the optimal income tax problem the 
same problem when productivity is observable by firms and when 
education, but not productivity, is observable by firms is that the 
constraints characterizing individual optimization are slightly 
modified. Before, a high productivity worker who considered receiving 
the low productivity worker's subsidy could decrease his education 
below that of a low productivity worker and yet have the same 
productivity as he and receive the same wage. When productivity is 
not observable, however, high productivity workers must choose the 
education level of a low productivity worker to receive his wage, and 
hence his subsidy, as wages depend only on education. As shall be 
demonstrated in the next section, this means that the social 
optimization is subject to greater constraint when productivity is 
observable than when it is not, so greater social welfare is possible 
when productivity cannot be observed. 
Before making a rigorous comparison of the two cases, it is 
first necessary to set up the optimization problem when education is 
observable. In this case the optimization may be formulated as the 
choice of w1, w2, y1, and y2 to
(12a) 
(12b) 
(12c) 
(12d) 
Max G(w1 - o1Cy1), w2 - c2<Y2>> 
subject to s1 + s2 - w1 - w2 L 0, 
w2 - 02<Y2> - wl + c2<Y1> L O, 
and w1 - c1Cy1) - w2 + c1Cy2) .L O. 
The constraints have the same interpretation as in the 
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previous model. A direct analogue of Proposition 1, i.e., constraint 
(12c) holds with equality and constraint (12d) is redundant, follows 
the proof of Proposition 1 with y1 substituted for s1 and y2 
substituted for s2• In addition, it then follows that �2.Ni_. 
Y2u1, and w2.Lw1• 
The Lagrangean for this optimization is 
(13) L = G(w1 - c1Cy1), w2 - c2<Y2>> 
+ A(sl(yl) + s2<Y2> - wl - w2) 
+ µ(w2 - c2<Y2> - wl + c2<Y1>>. 
The first-order conditions are 
(14a) G1 -A 
•• •• 
- µ = 0
G2 -A 
•• •• 
+ µ = 0(14b) 
(14c) 
(14d) 
(14e) 
(14f) 
I •• •• I •• •• I •• 
-G1c1Cy1 ) +A s1Cy1 ) + µ c2Cy1 ) = 0
' .. .. , .. .. ' .. 
-G2c2(y2 ) +A s2(y2 ) - µ c2(y2 ) = 0 
•• •• •• •• s1<Y1 ) + s2<Y2 ) - wl - w2 = O 
• •  •• • •  • •  
w2 - c2<Y2 ) - wl + c2<Y1 ) = o. 
•••s indicate the optimal choices. 
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Just as Proposition 1 held for this case, so w ill Proposition 
2 . This can be proven from the first-order conditions (14a)-(14d) as 
follows: 
I •• I •• 
(14b) and (14d) => s2Cy2 ) - c2Cy2 ) = 0 (efficiency for 2' s). 
I •• I •• 
(14a) and (14c) => s1Cy1_> - cl(yl ) 
•• I •• I •• 
µ (cl(yl ) - c2<Y1 )) 
•• 
A 
> o. 
•• 
Bence, y1 is, by the second derivative condition, (5), less than the 
efficient level. 
In the presence of optimal income taxation, the informational 
externalities that result from employers being unable to observe 
productivity are, in terms of efficiency, fully corrected. The 
incentive effects of the optimal tax become qualitatively the same as 
those w hen productivity is observable: only underinvestment in 
education is possible. This result corresponds to the result in 
Miller (1978) that in economies with a continuum of agents the 
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disincentive effect of the inc'ome tax will always dominate the 
signaling effect when the tax is optimally set and the social welfare 
functional is concave. 
IV. A COMPARISCN OF THE 1WO INFORMATION S'IXUCTURES 
Before examining information structures that are intermediate 
between the ones discussed in the previous two sections, we will show 
that if these structures are the only possible, then having 
productivity observed directly will never result in greater welfare 
than having productivity signaled. The intuitive reason for this 
result is that the signaling information structure has both efficiency 
and distributional advantages. The efficiency advantage results from 
the fact that the signaling effect offsets, but does not dominate, the 
disincentive effect of the tax. The distributional advantage is 
rooted in the fact that denying high productivity workers the full 
exploitation of their competitive advantage by forcing them to signal 
that advantage serves, in essence, to redistribute income from them to 
the low productivity workers. Another way of considering the 
redistributional aspect of signaling is that the condition on 
individual income maximization in the signaling case (12c) is less 
constraining (more income may be redistributed) than the corresponding 
constraint when productivity is observed (Sc). The following theorem 
is proved by utilizing that property of the contraints. 
Theorem !: 
•• •• •• •• • • • • 
G (wl -c1<Y1 ),w2 -c2<Y2 )),LG(wl-cl(s1>. w2-c2<s2)). 
Proof. 
• • • • • • 
Let yi: yi(si). We show that w1, w2, y2, and y2 
satisfy (12b) and (12c). (12b) holds trivially. By (6) and (Sc), 
(15) 
• • • • w2 - c2<Y2> - wl + c2<Y2<s1)) L o. 
• • • 
From (1), y2 (s1> i y1 (s1> = y1 and by (4),
(16) 
• • 
c2<Y2<s1» i c2<Y1>· 
Combining (15) and (16) give 
(17) 
• • • • w2 - c2 (y2) - wl + c2(yl) L o. 
• • • • 
Bence, (12c) holds for w1, w2, y1, and y2 and the theorem follows 
immediately. 
Note that the solution to (8a)-(8c) may not satisfy the 
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redundant constraint, (12d). This constraint is redundant only at an 
optimum; a suboptimal allocation which satisfies (12c) need not 
satisfy (12d). This is because in the signaling case it is easier for 
low productivity workers to receive the high productivity wage; they 
need only signal that they are high productivity workers rather than 
achieve the productivity of high productivity workers. Because the 
optimal allocation when productivity is directly observable may not be 
feasible under signaling (but some feasible allocation will yield more 
welfare), the signaling economy should not be expected to yield a 
Pareto-superior allocation. 
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V. A NU.MERICAL EXAMPLE 
This section gives a num erical example of the optimizations 
described in the previous sections. The cost and production functions 
are taken to be 
2 cl(y) = 2y • 
2 c2(y) = y • sl (y) By. and s2(y) = 16y.
2 2 
=> c1(s) = � and c2(s) = �· 
The social welfare is taken to be multiplicative (Cobb-Douglas), 
G(�·Ni> =?\Ni. 
The efficient levels of productivity and education are: 
eff 
= 
16•1 
eff = 2 Y1 
eff = 128s2 
eff 
= 8.Y2 
We now set up the Lagrangean and first-order -conditions when 
productivity is observable and find the optimal values of all relevant 
variables. 
2 2 
.1 � L = (wl - 32) (v2 - 256) + l(s1+s2-w1-w2) + µ
(18a) aL • a;- = .. 2 1 
• ( s2) -- . .
256 - l - µ = 0 
2 2 
s2 sl 
(wl - 256 - w2 + 256)
(18b) 
(18c) 
(18d) 
(18e) 
(18f) 
(19) 
(20) 
= 0
(21) 
(22) 
• 2
...11. = .. •aw2 1
<s1> • • -o--"'--A. +µ -32 
• • 2 • 
...11. = 
-sl (w• - � 
. 
·�-256 ) + l + µ 128 - 0 asl 
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• 
2 
• 2 • 
...11. = 
-s2 
(w• -
(sl) • sl �) + l - µ 128 = 0as2
n. 
ai 
128 1 
• • • • sl + s2 - wl - w2 = 0
• • 2 
aL • <s2> • � 
aµ 
=
 ... 2 - 256 - ... 1 + 256 = 0
• • (18b) and (18d) => s2 = 128 => y2 = 8
Add (18a) to (18b) to get: 
• 
• • • 2
eff 
Y2 
l = 
wl + w2 � 
'2 - 64 -
32• 
Subtract (18a) from (18b) to get: 
•µ 
• • ( * >
2 - W ,S1 • 
2 
W2 1 
+ ____..__ - 3 • 2 64 
Add (18c) to (18f) to geti 
• • 2 
• sl ( sl) .. 2 = 2 - 5'12 + 96 • 
Substituting (18f) into (19) and (18c) into (20). 
• • 2
• sl ( s 
) 
l = - 1 2 - � + 32 
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(23) 
(24) 
• 27( s1) 
11· = �· 
Then substitute (21), (22), and (23) into (18c) and simplify 
• 315(s 1> 
65536 
• 2 3s• 3(sl) ::.:.! + 32 = O. - 64 - 2 
The relevant root is 
• • eff s1 14.9001 => y1 1.8625 ( y1 • 
The solution is then: 
• yl :::: 39.8837
• w2 ::: 103 .0164
• !\ :::: 32.9457 • � :::: 39.0164
GCt\.�> ::: 1285.4261
• • !\ + � :::: 71.9622
• • 
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The net output of the economy, !\ + �· is very close to the
maximum possible net output of 72. The value for G is also not far 
from its first-best value, 1296. Of course. with a social welfare 
function that placed more weight on distributional considerations than 
does the multiplicative form, the deviation from the first-best in 
both efficiency and welfare terms would be greater. When productivity 
is signaled the economy does even better; greater welfare is achieved 
with less loss in efficiency. 
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When productivity is signaled the Lagrangean and first-order 
conditions are: 
L = C w1 - 2yi ><w2 yi > + ).(8yl + 16y2 - wl - w2)
(25a) 
(25b) 
(25o) 
(25d) 
(25e) 
(25f) 
yielding 
+ l1(Y2 - wl + Yi - �) 
-21. = w•• - (y**>2 - ,_•• - 11·· = 0aw1 2 2 
-21. = .. •• - 2(y**>2 - ,_•• + 11·· = 0aw2 1 1 
-21. = -4y••c.,.•• - Cy**>2> + 8,_•• + 211••y•• = o ay1 1 2 2 1 
-21. = -2y••c .. •• - 2cy**>2> + 16,_•• - 211y•• = o ay2 2 1 1 2 
aL ** ** ** ** n = 8y1 + 16y2 - w1 - w2 = o 
aL _ •• _ ** ( **>2 _ ( **>2 _ O a11 - •2 wl + Y1 Y2 -
The first-order conditions are solved the same way as before, 
•• 
Y1 ::: 1.9486 < y
eff 
1 
•• wl :::: 41.6930
•• N1 ::: 34.0988
Comparing the two models gives 
••
Y2 
•• y2 
8. effY2 
::: 101.8959
•• � ::: 37 .8959
and 
GC!\*· �*> :: 1292.2054 > GC!\.�> 
�· + �· :: • • 71.9947 > N1 + N2
It is seen then that with signaling the efficiency loss is 
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very slight and that it is possible to redistribute somewhat more than 
one additional unit of income from the high productivity workers to 
the low productivity workers. This example is. of course, just an 
illustration of the preceding theorem and the n1D11bers chosen have no 
significance other than that they make the n1D11erical derivation of the 
optimlDll tractable. Although the improvement in welfare in this example 
was miniscule, in general, the size of the improvement will depend on 
the social welfare function and the differences in the cost and 
productivity functions of the two groups. The larger the differences 
in the cost and productivity functions between the two groups. the 
easier it will be to satisfy the individual optimization constraint. 
_Also, the relative sizes of the two groups (for the example they were 
taken to be equal) will also affect the welfare gain from signaling. 
VI. A THEOREM ON ll>RE GENERAL INFOB.MAI'ION S'IRUCIURES
This section considers information structures that are 
intermediate in information content between productivity being 
observed for all workers and being signaling by all workers. Such an 
information structure will be characterized by the parameter p, where 
p a [0,1] is the proportion of (high productivity) workers whose 
productivity is .!!.Q! observable. Since low productivity workers 
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essentially receive their jobs by default. it does not matter whether 
or not their productivity is observable. There are at least two ways 
in which the information structure may be interpreted. One is that it 
may be considered as rules that restrict the transmission of 
information that accurately conveys worker productivity. 
Alternatively. these rules may require that a certain proportion of 
hiring be based on an ''objective'' signaling criterion. Affirmative 
action programs. although intended to remedy discrimination, would 
appear to be a government action that works in this way. The 
strictness of the such hiring rules and the level of their enforcement 
would determine the value of p, either in a deterministic or 
probabilistic way. Note that in the context of this model, aside from 
the impact they have on discrimination, affirmative action rules are 
redistributive in nature. 
It is proved that even when these mixed information structures 
are considered. there is still no information structure that yields 
more welfare than the one where no worker's producitivity is 
observable, (p=l). Intuitively, this means that as far as the 
structure of incentives is concerned, there is no favorable 
interaction between the two kinds of high productivity workers. All 
that occurs is that as p increases, the constraints on the economy are 
diminished. This point is illustrated by the construction of an 
auxiliary optimization problem which embodies constraints (Sc) and 
(12c). This optimization problem may be written as: 
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(26a) Max G(w1 - c1(s1). pf(w2 - c2Cs2)) + (1 - p)f(w3 - c3Cs3))) 
(26b) 
(26c) 
(26d) 
subject to s1 + ps2 + (1 - p)s3 - w1 - pw2 
- (1 - p)w3 2. 0 
Y3 - c3Cs3) - "'1 + c3Cs1> 2. 0 
and ..,2 - c2Cs2) - "'l + c2Cy1Cs1)) 2. 0 
The high productivity workers Yhose productivity is not observable are 
denoted by 2's and those whose productivity is observable are denoted
by 3's. The maximand, (26a) has been altered to reflect the fact that 
high productivity workers are now of two types; the function f, which 
is taken to be (weakly) concave, gives the distributional weights 
attached to the two kinds of high productivity workers. Inequality 
(26b) is the budget constraint; (26c) and (26d) are the individuals 
optimization constraints. As before, the redundant constraints, which 
are still redundant. may be omitted. For p=O. this optimization is 
equivalent to (8a)-(8c) and for p=l, it is equivalent to (12a)-(12c). 
Note that it is less constrained that the true optimization problem 
for the mixed case because it does not include the restriction that 
the tax system levies the same tax on individuals with the same income 
<s2=s3 => w2=tr3). Also, individual optimization constraints between
2's and 3's are emitted. These emissions are inconsequential if the 
economy is centralized, tho employer and tho taxing authority are the 
same entity. In this case this optimization problem is the proper 
one. The L agrangean for this problem is 
(27) L = G(w1 - c1(s1), pf(w2 - c2(s2)) + (1 - p)f(w3 - c3Cs 3)))
(28a) 
(28b) 
(28c) 
(28d) 
(28e) 
+ A(Sl + ps2 + (1 - p)s3 - w1 - pw2 - (1 - p)w3)
+ µ(w3 - c3Cs3) - Yl + c3<s1
>>
+ p(w2 - c2<s2> - "'1 + c2<Y1<s1
)))
The first-order conditions are then 
G1 - A - µ - p = O. 
G2p/ (�) - AP + p = 0 
G2(1 - p)f
1
(�) - A(l-p) + µ = 0 
I I I I 
- Glcl(sl) +A+ µc3<s1) + pc2<Y1>Y1(sl) = O 
I I I 
-pG2f (�)c2Cs2) + AP - pc2Cs2) = 0 
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(28f) - (1 - p)G2f
1
(� )c; Cs3) + A(l - p) - µc; <s3) = O. 
In addition, there are the usual first-order conditions associated 
with the constraints. It is understood that the variables in (28a)-
(28f) represent their values at an optimum . 
To show that p=l gives the optimal information structure, we 
show that for the auxiliary optimization welfare never decreases as p 
increases. 
!&!!!!!A-
dG 2. o. dp 
Proof. 
By the envelope theorem, 
(29) : = G2(f(N:2 ) - f(� )) + A.Cs2 - s3 - w2 + w3> • 
But, 
(28b) and (28e) ' => c2Cs2) = 1
(28c) and (28f) ' => c3<s3) = 1. 
But 2's and 3's have the same cost function, so s2 = s3• Then (29) 
reduces to 
(30) dG dp = G2CfCN:i > - f(� )) + A.(11'3 - 11'2)
when w2 = w3• the lemma follow s immediately. If 11'2 F w3• (26c) and
(26d) imply that 11'2 < w3• The concavity of f gives
(31) f(� ) - f(� ) £ -f
1 (�) Cw3 - w2>
Then (30) and (31) => � £ C-G2f1(� ) + A.)(w3-.2>·
From (28b) • 
-G2f
1(� ) +A. = ! £ o.
proving the lemma. 
The feasible set described by (28b)-(28d) is identical with 
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that of the true optimization problem for p=O and p=l and is at least 
as large for intermediate values of p. Hence, we have 
VII. 
Theorem i: The optimal choice of .l! .!! .l! = !. 
Proof. Immediate from the Lemma. 
CONQ.UDING REMAllS 
Although this model was developed in terms of the education 
signaling model, it is applicable in other situations where effort 
affects productivity. The rat-race model of assembly-line speed and 
the labor/leisure model of worker behavior under income taxation fall 
into this class. As long as the workers' utility functions are 
separable between after-tax wage income and effort, the results are 
unchanged. In a centralized economy the results may be interpreted as 
saying that wages should not depend solely on output, that considering 
just individual effort, if observable, leads to higher welfare. 
Various extensions of the model may prove fruitful. There is 
nothing special, it would appear, about the assum ption of two kinds of 
workers; the effects that lead to higher welfare under signaling are 
still present with more types of workers, including a continuum . 
Relaxing the restrictions on the functional form of worker's utility 
is also of interest, because in that case the income tax is not 
equivalent to an education tax, so more complex incentive structures 
are possible. In this setting it is also possible that the results of 
this paper no longer hold as strongly. 
2 9 
Further generalization of the model are possible by introduced 
noise into the system. so that the choice of information structure 
includes the choice of a signaling mechanism from a num ber of noisy 
signals. Work by Spence (1976b) indicates that in the absence of 
corrective taxation, such noise is desirable. Noise may also be 
present in the economy in that productivity may only be imperfectly 
observable, which will make the individual optimization constraints 
less binding at some cost in efficiency. 
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1. See Spence (1974b) for a general discussion of signaling behavior.
2 . Of course, if the goverI1111ent wishes to raise revenues, a lum p-sum 
tax independent of abilities is efficient. 
3 .  Since both groups are given wages that are greater than s1, which
is positive, they can never be zero. If the marginal 
productivity of education to low productivity workers is low 
enough (e.g., always zero), the productivity corresponding to 
zero education will be chosen and the corresponding first- order 
condition will not hold with equality. This will not affect any 
of the analysis except for the fact that if education adds no 
productivity, it cannot be underinvested in. If the signal is 
also unproductive for high productivity workers, they still end 
up at efficient investment (zero). 
4. See Spence (1976a) for a discussion of this signaling equilibrium .
S. Unless, of course, education is productive for neither group. The 
resulting allocation is a constrained Pareto optimum ; hence, by 
the results of Wilson (1977) there is no problem with the 
existence of the equilibrium . In essence, the tax system 
provides the cross- subsidies necessary to maintain an equilibrium 
in the face of competition. 
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